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Big data, open data and the climate risk market 
 
As the deep structural “uncertainties” that are beginning to define the early twenty-first 
century continue to unfold (Hay and Payne 2013), the question of how societies should 
respond to the decline - and the consequences of - the era of carbon capitalism become 
increasingly pressing. For some, the answer to these challenges is found in a further defining 
trend of the contemporary era – advances in digital information and communication 
technologies such as big data analytics, smart cities and social media communications. In 
this chapter, we critically examine some key developments at one site where three 
phenomena related to these trends – climate change, big data and financial capitalism – 
intersect: data-driven climate risk markets. Situating these developments in the context of 
emergent forms of “informational power” (Braman 2006) and data policy struggles that aim 
to make meterological data more readily exploitable by climate market actors, the chapter 
asks what it might mean to turn to climatic uncertainty as a source of profit and growth. 
Climatic uncertainty 
As many scientists and commentators have observed, planetary ecosystems are in a state of 
crisis. In a 2009 Nature article, Johan Rockström and colleagues identified the various ways 
in which human action is stressing the ecological “carrying capacity” of the planet 
(Rockström et al. 2009). In their paper, Rockström et al. quantify a range of “planetary 
boundaries” in order to identify a variety of ecological processes and the “associated 
thresholds” that could not be crossed without generating “unacceptable environmental 
change”. Their analysis identifies that the boundaries for “climate change, rate of 
biodiversity loss and interference with the nitrogen cycle” have already been passed – 
unacceptable environmental change is occurring. Further, in the case of “global freshwater 
use, change in land use, ocean acidification and interference with the global phosphorous 
cycle”, these boundaries are being quickly approached. 
Such warnings about the impact of human action on the Earth’s ecosystems are echoed by 
many expert commentators, including scientists involved in the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC assessment reports are a collaborative effort involving 
thousands of researchers and governments from around the world. The report is a 
systematic review of publications relevant to the scientific, technical and socio-economic 
aspects of climate change.  The aim is to provide a comprehensive view of current 
knowledge. The most recent report was published in 2014, and its conclusions were 
unambiguous:  
“Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the 
observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere 
and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea 
level has risen.” 
Further, 
“Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-industrial 
era, driven largely by economic and population growth, and are now higher than 
ever. This has led to atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and 
nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, 
together with those of other anthropogenic drivers, have been detected throughout 
the climate system and are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the 
observed warming since the mid-20th century.” (IPCC 2014) 
Big data and informational power 
Scientific knowledge about phenomena such as climate change is highly data dependent. 
Without the appropriate data it would not be possible to identify the extent to which the 
global climate has altered over the years or analyse the potential causes. Without the ability 
to analyse vast amounts of weather observation data, society would only experience the 
consequences of climate change: extreme weather, rising sea levels, crop failures, and so 
on. 
The meteorological and climate sciences have long been data-driven disciplines (Edwards 
2013). The reason we know that the climate is changing, why it is changing, and how we 
should respond, is the result of decades of complex processes of data collection, cleaning, 
analysis and modelling by climate scientists. Meteorological organisations around the world 
hold vast archives of weather observations that can be analysed to predict the weather and 
understand average weather conditions - the climate - over time. Scientists are also 
exploring innovate ways to fill in the gaps in their datasets in order to increase their 
understanding. For example, citizen science projects such as Old Weather 
(https://www.oldweather.org/) that use the labour of volunteer ‘citizen scientists’ to 
transcribe historical shipping records, so that the digitised data can be fed into weather 
observation databases and climate models. 
However, it is not only scientists that are interested in using data in order to understand and 
respond to changes in the climate. As meteorological data becomes more abundant and 
fine-grained, it – like many other forms of data - is being increasingly exploited by those who 
want to use high level data analytics in order to extract profits. This, according to Mayer-
Schonberger and Cukier (2014), is the era of “datafication” in which more and more aspects 
of human existence are being quantified and turned into computerised data. Over the last 
decade it has become almost cliché to claim that “data is the new oil”, or - as the former 
European Commissioner for Digital Agenda Neelie Kroes’ (2011) claimed – “the new gold”. 
Exponential increases in data and computing power, the World Economic Forum argue, are 
fuelling a “Fourth Industrial Revolution” (Schwab, 2016). While such claims are open to 
critique, for example, we may draw on Webster’s analysis of earlier claims about the 
revolutionary nature of informationalisation that question the notion of revolutions within a 
capitalist political economy, it is still vital to recognise the deepening dependence of the 
capitalist mode of production on data.  
Sandra Braman (2006) alludes to these developments in her conceptualisation of the 
“Informational State”. In her work, she observes the development of a deepening form of 
“informational power” beginning in the 1970s and 1980s. She argues that while analyses of 
power have tended to categorise the concept into instrumental, structural and symbolic 
forms of power, processes of information intensification in recent decades have brought a 
further type – “informational power” – to the core of contemporary power relations. This 
“informational” form of power, she argues, interacts with other forms of power by 
“manipulating” their “informational bases” (p. 26). She illustrates a number of examples of 
this developing “informational base” for instrumental, structural and symbolic forms of 
power with reference to Smart Weapons, internet surveillance, personalised web-services, 
social profiling and manipulation of public opinion. Braman further argues that the 
processing and distribution of information are also often key factors in “the transformation 
of power from potential to actual” (p. 27).  
It is important that this informational form of power is addressed as we try and navigate 
through the complex and uncertain terrain of the contemporary era. It is clear that data 
analytics will contribute to how societies respond to the significant challenges we face in the 
21st century, but also that many of these data-related practices generate deep uncertainties 
of their own. The different interests that are empowered and disempowered by how data 
are generated, processed and used will be heavily influenced by the wider dynamics of 
political economy and culture. It is therefore important to integrate an understanding of 
datafication into our analysis of the broader processes of change. In order to ‘make real’ 
some of these issues, the rest of the chapter will now turn to examining such developments 
in relation to climate risk markets.  
The climate risk market 
Similar to climate science, financial markets have long been data-dependent. Streams of 
data are crunched by algorithms and models, and feed into human and automated decision-
making processes which have significant impact throughout society. Weather derivatives are 
a type of climate risk product traded in the global financial markets. These financial products 
cover businesses for “moderate departures” from expected weather conditions; as opposed 
to traditional indemnity insurance, which covers for significant departures (e.g. extreme 
events) and catastrophic loss (Dischel 2002, 8). Rather than insuring against a specific 
observable loss, payouts on weather derivative contracts are instead triggered when 
particular meteorological conditions, e.g. the average temperature over a month, are 
detected in vast indexes of weather observation data. Key actors in the marekts include 
businesses and governments wanting to hedge against climate risk, re-insurance firms, 
institutional investors, and exchanges such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).  
Much of the primary market trading in weather derivatives occurs in the over-the-counter 
(OTC) market, through which bespoke contracts are negotiated in private between buyers 
and sellers (Speedwell Weather n.d.). Buyers typically are firms in sectors such as energy, 
agriculture and construction; while sellers tend to be re-insurance firms such as SwissRe. 
There is also a secondary market in weather derivatives that trades primarily through the 
CME (SCOR Global 2012). In this secondary market, primary market contracts are traded in 
order to manage risk. While many buyers in the primary markets have traditionally been 
aiming to hedge against climate related risks, a new class of speculative investor in climate 
risk has emerged post-financial crash. In 2013, the largest source of new trades in the 
market was from hedge funds speculating on average monthly temperatures (Thind 2014), 
which essentially means using data-driven techniques in order to speculate, and ultimately 
profit, on climatic uncertainty.  
Weather derivatives were developed within the US energy industry by Enron, Koch 
Industries and Aquila in the late 1990s when Enron found insurance companies unwilling to 
insure the company against non-extreme weather events such as the company experienced 
during a period of mild US winters from 1997-99 (WRMA n.d. (a); Dischel 2002, p. 3). The 
deregulation of the US energy market had resulted in lower, more competitive energy prices 
in the USA; a situation which aggravated the problem by restricting energy suppliers’ ability 
to extract a surplus from consumers in order to cover periods of unexpected weather 
conditions (Dischel 2002, p. 3). In order to overcome this barrier, Enron created its own 
financial product – the weather derivative – taking inspiration from the energy futures 
markets in which it was involved. The development of the product as a derivative (and 
therefore a financial, rather than insurance, product) allowed Enron to avoid the regulatory 
constraints placed on energy companies’ use of insurance products (Randalls 2010).   
While weather derivative contracts are traded across all forms of weather event, by far the 
most popular contracts have been based on temperature and the divergence of the average 
daily temperature from 18⁰C. These products, which are popular with firms in the energy 
industry, are known as Heating and Cooling Degree Days (HDD and CDD) contracts (WRMA 
n.d. (b)). Over recent years, however, the primary market which provides derivative 
contracts to end-user businesses has diversified, and a wider and more complex range of 
products are being developed across a range of weather conditions. One such product is the 
quantity-adjusting option, or quanto, derivative which combines weather and commodity 
price risk within a single derivative contract. For example, a company could receive a pay-
out on a contract if the temperature is lower than expected, but the pay-out would be 
calculated in relation to the price of gas (Risk.net 2010).  
Such developments illustrate new innovations in the weather derivatives market, however 
overall the success of the market over the last two decades has been mixed. The weather 
derivatives market saw massive growth in the mid-2000s, experiencing both the hedge fund 
boom of 2005-6 (notional trading value of $45 billion) and the pre-crash boom of 2007-8 
($32 billion) (Randalls 2010). As with other forms of financial product, the vulnerability of 
the weather derivatives market was highlighted when the market crashed during 2008-9 
and 2009-10, with only slow signs of growth by 2011 ($11.8 billion) (WRMA 2009; WRMA 
2011). These figures, based upon surveys undertaken by PricewaterhouseCoopers on behalf 
of the WRMA, cover the period 2003 to 2011. No surveys have been published since 2011, 
and no up to date figures for the size of the market therefore exist. However, despite the 
dip in the market, in 2011 the WRMA (2011) was hopeful for weather derivatives, pointing 
to continuing growth outside the US markets throughout the downturn, growing interest in 
non-temperature-related weather derivatives, and increasing interest from outside the 
energy industry, and more recent industry reports suggest the market is beginning to 
expand again (Thind 2014). 
Getting the data to market 
As financial products based on vast indexes of weather observations, traders in the weather 
derivatives markets require access to significant amounts of historical and real-time 
meteorological data. While there has been significant diversification in the sources of data 
used by market actors in recent years, data produced by national meteorological agencies is 
still perceived to be preferable due to its high quality and public agencies’ substantial 
archives of historic data. 
In the early days of weather derivatives trading, the right to re-use without charge weather 
data produced by national meteorological agencies was a prominent discourse at industry 
events. Over recent years, focus on this issue has reduced, however the ease with which 
market actors can access and re-use publicly funded meteorological data is still perceived to 
be a significant issue, and a lack of freely available data in some countries is perceived to be 
a barrier to market growth. In particular, it has been widely noted that while in the USA 
weather data has been in the public domain and freely available for anyone to re-use since 
before the development of weather derivative markets, in some competing markets, such as 
the UK, the large volumes of weather data required by the climate risk industry have been 
treated as a commodity to be traded by the national meteorological agency (Weiss 2002).  
Those promoting the development of weather derivative markets in the UK, including 
lobbyists for the UK financial services industry such as Lighthill Risk Network (of which 
Lloyds of London are a member), have spoken out against this practice for a number of 
years (Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 2008). They have called 
for Met Office data to be made available to commercial users at marginal cost (which tends 
to be zero for digital resources), so that traders can freely access and use it and, therefore, 
compete more effectively with the US markets. In the early days of the markets, for 
example, Weiss (2002) observed that limited access to weather data in the EU had, by 2002, 
resulted in a weather and climate risk management industry 13.5 times smaller than the 
nascent US industry which by this date had built up US$9.7 billion dollars of contract value 
over 5 years.   
These demands have filtered down into UK government policy-making. For example, policy 
documentation developed by senior policy makers in what was at the time named the 
Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (2008, p. 52) indicates support 
for the financial industry’s demand for free use of weather data in order to boost the UK’s 
weather derivatives market. While policy developments began slowly, the election of the 
new coalition government in the UK in May 2010 led to the demand for free use of 
meteorological data being quickly incorporated into the government’s flagship Transparency 
and Open Government Data agenda, in line with Open Data advocates’ campaign against 
the commercialisation of public sector data. In the Autumn Statement of 2011, the policy 
developments came to a head with the announcement by Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
George Osborne, that the UK government was opening “the largest volume of high quality 
weather data and information made available by a national meteorological organisation 
anywhere in the world” for anyone to re-use without charge (HM Government 2011). Senior 
politicians advocating for Open Data, such as MP Francis Maude (2012), spoke publicly 
about the advantages for the climate risk industry, and according to well-placed policy-
makers interviewed by the author some hoped these developments would make the UK 
weather derivative market competitive with the US-based markets (Bates and Goodale 
2017).  Yet, despite the hopes of these key political actors, opening the UK’s meteorological 
data has faced challenges as the Met Office has struggled to adapt to a fully open data 
environment (Bates and Goodale 2017). Nevertheless, despite these barriers, the climate 
risk industry is still able to access and process vast amounts of meteorological data in order 
to trade weather derivate and related climate risk products – albeit with some charges still 
in place. 
Hedging against the climate and the exploitation of uncertainty 
For advocates of these climate risk products, one of the key benefits is considered to be that 
they reduce firms’ exposure to financial volatility resulting from climate instabilities. While 
in the long term a business should expect to pay more in to climate risk products than they 
receive in pay-outs, the business should also expect gains due to having a less volatile profit 
margin (Dutton 2002, p. 208). For example, the business should be better able to secure 
credit and protect its market value. For this reason, many perceive that climate risk products 
increase the “resilience” of businesses and other end users as they adapt to climate change 
(Michel-kerjan 2013), allowing them to effectively “eliminate the effects of weather and 
climate from the income statement” (Dutton 2002, p. 209). As Dischel (2002, p. 19) states: 
“The goal of hedging is to be less concerned, or not concerned at all, about the 
impact of weather on cashflow or return. Management achieves freedom from the 
weather when it engages in a hedge.” 
At the same time as increasing the ‘resilience’ of industries and countries that are 
vulnerable to climate change, climate risk products, it is claimed, offer a substantial growth 
opportunity for markets to take advantage of in the coming years. For some, therefore, 
climate risk products are seen as a double win: helping to stabilise economies as firms 
navigate the uncertain weather conditions that climate change brings and simultaneously 
making substantial profits that contribute to overall economic growth, particularly in the 
financial centres of the global economy.  
Many liberal economists would argue with Stiglitz (2012, pp. 42-3) that within a capitalist 
economy market failure occurs when there is either imperfect competition; externalities 
(when a group is affected – positively or negatively – by others’ economic activity); 
information asymmetry; or when risk markets are absent. Some might therefore argue that 
the development of climate risk markets and the increasing availability of free 
meteorological data might counter some of the market failure problems posed by climate 
change.  
However, in relation to the mitigation of climate change there are risks in the development 
of weather derivative markets that could lead to negative societal outcomes. This is because 
they enable the finance industry to generate substantial profits from products that aim to 
create a sense of security for end-users concerned about climate instability, allowing them 
to be “less concerned, or not concerned at all, about the impact of weather on cashflow or 
return” (Dischel 2002, p. 19). These climate risk markets in effect risk reducing the incentive 
of powerful economic actors to take and demand significant action to mitigate climate 
change. Such a scenario could increase the negative impact of the actions of those 
benefiting from these markets, at the expense of the majority, particularly those most 
vulnerable to climate instability. As more speculators enter the market (Thind, 2014), the 
increase in climatic uncertainty as mitigation efforts fail also presents a growing opportunity 
to extract profit from the crisis. 
While climate risk markets have many interested parties advocating on their behalf, there 
are others that are more sceptical. Melinda Cooper (2010), for example, argues that 
weather derivatives are “a claim over the future in all its unknowability – a claim over event 
worlds that have yet to actualize in space and time” (p. 181). In her analysis of some of 
these deep seated uncertainties, Cooper (2010) draws on documents produced in 2008 by 
the US Government’s National Intelligence Council and the US non-profit Centre for a New 
American Security to argue that, in the world of US strategic scenario planning, “turbulence” 
in relation to financial markets, climate change, and energy (p. 169) is no longer perceived 
as something that there is a possibility of managing and avoiding; rather, “turbulence…is 
assumed” (p. 184). She argues that, as US strategists have attempted to understand what 
these deepening uncertainties mean for US geopolitical power in the context of shifting 
economic power, they have turned to “turbulence” as a form of “productivity” (p. 170) to be 
leveraged in order to achieve the key strategic aim of sustaining US geopolitical power. One 
critical objective of US strategists aiming to navigate through these uncertain waters, she 
observes, is “to dominate… the securitized risk markets, in which weather turbulence plays 
an increasingly significant role [and which]…offer one possible exit strategy from the 
liabilities of the dollar–oil nexus” (p. 170).  
To turn to the anthropogenic (human-generated) turbulence and uncertainty that is the 
outcome of the last few hundred years of economic development as a source of new 
economic opportunity and growth betrays a rigidity in thinking about how societies might 
move beyond the challenges posed by carbon capitalism. While the development of new 
data analytics techniques aimed at exploiting turbulence may buy time in the short-medium 
term, climate risk and similar markets do not address the fundamental problem of economic 
growth and ecological sustainability in the long term. Drawing upon Rockstrom et al’s (2009) 
analysis, political economists Hay and Payne argue (2013) that many of the earth’s 
ecosystems are already in the ‘red zone’ and further degradation is directly related to 
“aggregate global [economic] growth rates”. This leads them to conclude that “we face not 
just a crisis of growth, but, much more significantly, a crisis for growth…we will need to 
wean ourselves off growth if we are to do anything that takes us out of the ‘red zone’” (p. 
6).  
Their argument that economies must move beyond growth in order to shift towards a 
sustainable form of development is not new, and has been approached from a number of 
perspectives. The Club of Rome’s 1972 report on the Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 
1972), for example, was the first analysis of the problematic relationship between economic 
growth and environmental sustainability, and these ideas have been taken up across a range 
of fields including sustainable development and ecological economics. Further, as Harvey 
(2011) argues, continued economic growth is not only environmentally unsustainable, but is 
implausible in the long term given that the rate of profitable investments to be found each 
year in order to maintain the compound growth that capitalism is dependent upon will at 
some point become impossible to maintain.  
Despite the observed efforts to leverage big data and new forms of data analytics in order 
to extract economic value from climatic uncertainty, the above arguments suggest that 
business as usual appears to no longer be an option in the longer term. Of course, while the 
argument for moving beyond growth as a measure of economic success might be relatively 
easy to conclude at the abstract level, the actual process of transition towards a new mode 
of economic development is more fraught and, of course, deeply political.  
Conclusion 
It is evident that various forms of power – including informational power - are being 
deployed in the development and promotion of climate risk products which, in part, aim to 
respond to the uncertainties posed by climate change. It is also apparent that these 
products benefit established interests, while, perhaps in some cases unintentionally, 
deepening the threats faced by the majority, particularly the most vulnerable in society. In 
the case of the UK government’s efforts to open significant amounts of public 
meteorological data in an effort to leverage the development of the UK’s climate risk 
market, we can observe an example of data policy being used by a government in an 
attempt to promote a deeply neoliberal, market-driven response to the conditions of 
uncertainty that we are facing in the early 21st century.  
These developments in data analytics and policy are being shaped to enable particular forms 
of response to conditions of uncertainty. Still, it would be problematic to argue that 
increased rights to access and use weather data, and the development of new data analytics 
techniques are something to be resisted - information is, after all, also necessary for those 
seeking to establish sustainable, democratic and ecologically sound political economies. 
However, significant questions remain unanswered about the societal and ecological 
impacts of climate risk markets, particularly in relation to their potential to disincentivise 
economically powerful actors’ engagement in climate change mitigation activity, and the 
socio-economic implications of empowering financial elites’ efforts to exploit deepening 
climate uncertainty. There is therefore a need to open up a debate about these forms of 
financialisation and think critically about how they might, and might not, impact wider 
efforts to respond to climate change and build more equal and inclusive societies. 
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